The resource-based view: A review and assessment of its critiques by Kraaijenbrink, Jeroen et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The resource-based view: A review and
assessment of its critiques
Jeroen Kraaijenbrink and JC Spender and Aard Groen
University of Twente, Lund University, University of Twente
2009
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21442/
MPRA Paper No. 21442, posted 18. March 2010 23:50 UTC
The RBV: a Review and Assessment of its Critiques 
 1 
THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW: A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF ITS CRITIQUES  
 
Jeroen Kraaijenbrink (corresponding author)1 
J.-C. Spender2 
Aard J. Groen3 
 
1University of Twente, Nikos 
P.O Box 217, 7500AE Enschede, Netherlands 
Phone: +31 53 489 5443, Fax: +31 53 489 2159 
e-mail: j.kraaijenbrink@utwente.nl 
 
2 ESADE Business School and University of Lund 
411 East 57th St, New York, NY 10022, USA 
Phone: +1 917 378 6250 
e-mail: jcspender@yahoo.com 
 
3University of Twente, Nikos 
P.O Box 217, 7500AE Enschede, Netherlands 
Phone: +31 53 489 4512, Fax: +31 53 489 2159 
e-mail: a.j.groen@utwente.nl 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
We express our gratitude to Michael Leiblein and two anonymous Journal of Management 
reviewers for their outstanding and developmental feedback. We also thank three anonymous 
reviewers of the Annual meeting of the Academy of Management (2007) who have commented 
on earlier versions of this paper.  
 
KEYWORDS 
RBV, sustained competitive advantage, neo-classical economics, Austrian economics
The RBV: a Review and Assessment of its Critiques 
 2 
THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW: A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF ITS CRITIQUES 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm has been around for over twenty years – during 
which time it has been both widely taken up and subjected to considerable criticism. We review 
and assess the principal critiques evident in the literature, arguing they fall into eight categories. 
We conclude the RBV’s core message can withstand criticism from five of these quite well 
provided the RBV’s variables, boundaries and applicability are adequately specified. Three 
critiques that cannot be readily dismissed call for further theorizing and research. They arise 
from the indeterminate nature of two of the RBV's basic concepts – resource and value – and the 
narrow conceptualization of a firm's competitive advantage. As our suggestions for this work 
indicate, we feel the RBV community has clung to an inappropriately narrow neo-classical 
economic rationality thereby diminishing its opportunities for progress. Our suggestions may 
assist with developing the RBV into a more viable theory of competitive advantage, especially if 
it is moved into a genuinely dynamic framework. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The resource-based view (RBV) has become one of the most influential and cited theories in the 
history of management theorizing. It aspires to explain the internal sources of a firm's sustained 
competitive advantage (SCA). Its central proposition is that if a firm is to achieve a state of SCA 
it must acquire and control valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN) resources 
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and capabilities, plus have the organization (O) in place that can absorb and apply them (Barney, 
1991a, 1994, 2002). This proposition is shared by several related analyses; core competences 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994), dynamic capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997) and the knowledge-based view (KBV) (Grant, 1996b).  
Given its elegant simplicity and its immediate face validity, the RBV’s core message is 
appealing, easily grasped and easily taught. Yet the RBV has also been extensively criticized for 
many weaknesses. Critiques are valuable for advancing the RBV, for by exploring its limitations 
they imply where improvements might be made. Along these lines we categorize and assess the 
eight categories of critiques available so far, adding comments about their severity and impact.  
Our analysis suggests the RBV’s core message can withstand five of these critiques quite 
well, especially when the RBV’s variables, boundaries, and applicability are more clearly 
specified. However, three threaten the RBV’s status as a core theory. These concern the 
indeterminate nature of two concepts fundamental to the RBV – resource and value – plus there 
are problems with the RBV’s narrow explanation of a firm's competitive advantage. As we shall 
argue, the common theme underlying these critiques is that the RBV has clung to an 
inappropriately narrow neo-classical economic rationality and has thereby diminished its 
opportunities for making further progress. Leveraging from the critiques and the discussions they 
have provoked, we suggest directions for future theorizing and research. We shall argue the way 
forward, perhaps, is to move the RBV into an inherently dynamic and subjectivist framework 
such as Penrose's (1959).  
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THE RBV AND ITS CRITIQUES 
 
The RBV developed as a complement to the industrial organization (IO) view with Bain (1968) 
and Porter (1979, 1980, 1985) as some of its main proponents. With its focus on the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm, the IO view put the determinants of firm performance outside 
the firm, in its industry's structure. Being positioned against this view, the RBV explicitly looks 
for the internal sources of SCA and aims to explain why firms in the same industry might differ 
in performance. As such, the RBV does not replace the IO view, rather it complements it 
(Barney, 2002; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Peteraf & Barney, 2003).  
The RBV's core metaphor is Ricardian, for it stands on the heterogeneity and immobility of 
competitive capability-producing and rent-earning resources (Barney, 1991b). Firms are seen as 
atom-like entities aiming to gain above-normal profits in unmediated competition with other 
firms in a shared market. The RBV assumes firms are profit maximizing entities directed by 
boundedly rational managers operating in distinctive markets that are to a reasonable extent 
predictable and moving towards equilibrium (Bromiley & Papenhausen, 2003; Leiblein, 2003). It 
accepts that information about the future value of a resource is asymmetrically distributed. If the 
firm's managers can estimate the future value of a resource better than their competitors – or 
when they are simply lucky – this provides their firm with ex ante sources of SCA. 
Subsequently, the development of isolating mechanisms that prevent other firms from competing 
their above-normal-profits away provides the firm with ex post sources of SCA (Mahoney, 1995; 
Rumelt, 1984). Given its focus on the resource as the firm's significant component and its 
uncomplicated view of firms as a bundle of these resources, the RBV is explicitly reductionist. It 
The RBV: a Review and Assessment of its Critiques 
 5 
stands against holistic or emergent theories that liken firms to organisms with complex feedback-
controlled mechanisms focused on boundary maintenance.  
The RBV’s principal development occurred between 1984 and the mid-nineties. After 
Wernerfelt’s initial paper (1984), contributions were made by many scholars, most notably 
Rumelt (1984), Barney (1986a, 1986b, 1991a), Dierickx & Cool (1989), Conner (1991; Conner 
& Prahalad, 1996), Helfat (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Helfat & Lieberman, 2002), Kogut & 
Zander (1992), Amit & Schoemaker (1993), Peteraf (1993), and Teece (Teece et al., 1997). Since 
then, the RBV has been applied to a wide range of phenomena, such as information systems 
(Wade & Hulland, 2004), organizational networks (Lavie, 2006) and even the Battle of Trafalgar 
(Pringle & Kroll, 1997). The theoretical and empirical development of the RBV has been 
analyzed in a number of review studies; recent are Acedo, Barroso, & Galan (2006), Armstrong 
& Shimizu (2007), Lockett, Thompson, & Morgenstern (2009), and Newbert (2007). 
 Along with its development, the RBV has been extensively criticized. Some of the critiques 
have been leveled indirectly by suggesting amendments to the RBV (Foss, Klein, Kor, & 
Mahoney, 2008; Makadok, 2001b). There are also polemical papers critiquing the RBV directly 
(Foss & Knudsen, 2003; Spender, 2006). In this respect, Priem & Butler’s (2001a, 2001b) 
critiques and Barney’s (2001) responses are widely-known. For those interested in advancing the 
RBV, the critiques are particularly valuable for they suggest where improvements might be 
made. Along these lines we assess the critiques so far offered, adding comments about their 
severity and impact. This, we hope, helps prepare the ground for future theorizing and research.  
The critiques fall into eight categories: 1) The RBV has no managerial implications; 2) The 
RBV implies infinite regress; 3) The RBV’s applicability is too limited; 4) SCA is not 
achievable; 5) The RBV is not a theory of the firm; 6) VRIN/O is neither necessary nor sufficient 
The RBV: a Review and Assessment of its Critiques 
 6 
for SCA; 7) The value of a resource is too indeterminate to provide for useful theory; and 8) The 
definition of resource is unworkable. We argue below that the first five critiques do not really 
threaten the RBV’s status. They are incorrect or irrelevant, or apply only when the RBV is taken 
to its logical or impractical extreme; better demarcating the RBV and its variables can contain 
them. However the last three critiques offer more serious challenges that need to be dealt with if 
the RBV is to realize more fully its potential to explain SCA, especially beyond predictable 
stable environments. 
 
Critique # 1. The RBV Has no Managerial Implications 
 
A first critique is that the RBV lacks substantial managerial implications or ‘operational validity’ 
(Priem & Butler, 2001a). It seems to tell managers to develop and obtain VRIN resources and 
develop an appropriate organization, but it is silent on how this should be done (Connor, 2002; 
Miller, 2003). A related critique is that the RBV invokes the ‘illusion of total control’, 
trivializing the property-rights issues, exaggerating the extent to which managers can control 
resources or predict their future value (McGuinness & Morgan, 2000). Along similar lines Lado 
et al. (2006) argue the RBV suffers a tension between descriptive and prescriptive theorizing.  
As this tension is present throughout management research and is not resolved (Van de Ven, 
2007), this critique should not be leveled at the RBV especially. The RBV is a theory aspiring to 
explain the SCA of some firms over others (Nelson, 1991; Rumelt, 1984) and, as such, was never 
intended to provide managerial prescriptions (Barney, 2005). Any explanations the RBV might 
provide may well be no more than indicative, yet still of value to managers, so we have no 
reason to oblige the RBV to generate theoretically compelling prescriptions. Rather than 
worrying about the RBV’s lack of managerial implications we should maybe worry more about 
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its evident impact on management practice, especially if it diverts management’s attention from 
more fruitful theorizing (see also Ghoshal, 2005; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). 
 
Critique # 2. The RBV Implies Infinite Regress 
 
A second critique is the RBV entails an infinite regress (Collis, 1994; Priem & Butler, 2001a). 
Collis provides an illustration of this, writing “A firm that has the superior capability to develop 
structures that better innovate products will, in due course, surpass the firm that has the best 
product innovation capability today…” (Collis, 1994: 148). Since a second-order capability 
(developing structures that better innovate products) will in due course be more valuable than 
any first-order capability (product innovation), the RBV suggests firms should strive to obtain 
such second-order capability. The point of this critique is that this step can be extended ad 
infinitum, leading firms into an endless search for ever higher-order capabilities. While this is 
true in an abstract sense, this critique does not really work against the RBV. Any applied theory, 
such as the RBV, lacks an unlimited number of levels of analysis, for each shift in level takes the 
analysis farther from the empirical level and thus from any practical implications. In the example 
above, introducing a third-order capability would already lead to an artificial theory that does not 
make much sense.  
As Lado et al. (2006) points out infinite regress is only a problem for those who consider 
management or economic science a positivistic quest for certainty – for the ultimate source of 
SCA. Once we appreciate strategic management as a practical engagement with indeterminacy 
and open-endedness, the infinite regress critique becomes less useful. Rather than treating 
higher-order capabilities as superior to lower-order capabilities our attention then focuses on 
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managing the interactions between them. More specifically, we may want to consider the 
interactions between operational competences and 'meta-competences' (Mahoney, 1995; Teece, 
2007), or between single-loop and double-loop learning (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Lado et al., 
2006). One may argue, for instance, that single-loop learning enhances efficiency and resource 
exploitation, while double-loop learning enhances innovation and resource exploration. Since the 
two make qualitatively different contributions and since we assume firms need to do both 
(March, 1991), ‘higher-order’ capabilities cannot be treated as logically prior or prioritized as the 
source of SCA. They are more likely to be interdependent and mutually supporting. 
 
Critique # 3.  The RBV’s Applicability Is Too Limited 
 
A third critique concerns the generalizability of the RBV, an argument that comes in three 
versions. First, Gibbert (2006a, 2006b) argues the notion of resource uniqueness – the melding of 
heterogeneity and immobility – denies the RBV any potential for generalization, ex definitio. 
One cannot generalize about uniqueness. As with the 'applied theory' defense above, we think 
this is being overly academic. Rather we agree with Levitas & Ndofor (2006) that it is perfectly 
possible to generate useful insights about degrees of resource uniqueness.  
 A second version of this critique comes, for instance, from Connor (2002), who argues 
that the RBV only applies to large firms with significant market power. As he argues, the smaller 
and nimbler firms’ SCA cannot be based on their static resources and therefore they fall beyond 
the bounds of the RBV. Connor’s argument is diluted whenever non-tangible resources are 
admitted – small firms may have unique competitive advantage generating capabilities. Though 
suggestive, Connor’s argument reminds us of another limitation to the RBV’s applicability: it 
The RBV: a Review and Assessment of its Critiques 
 9 
only applies to firms striving to attain SCA. For firms satisfied with their competitive position, 
the RBV does not bring much insight for its relevance follows directly from managers’ 
aspirations and intentions.  
 A third version of the applicability critique is implicit in Miller’s (2003) ‘sustainability-
attainability’ discussion. Miller's paper suggests the resources a firm needs to generate SCA are 
precisely those resources that are hard to acquire in the first place. In one sense, Miller’s 
argument is that only firms that already possess VRIN resources can acquire and apply additional 
resources, otherwise competitors would acquire them with equal ease. Miller draws our attention 
to the implicit path dependency within the RBV in that every firm’s past shapes its present and 
future performance. When not used to trace back to the ultimate root resources responsible for a 
firm’s SCA, though, this does not render the RBV overly problematic. If the RBV’s scope 
includes the individual resources and capabilities of the entrepreneurs that constituted the firm – 
and we see no reason why it should not – it even applies to newly founded firms. 
While these three critiques could be put aside, Barney (2002) indicates an important limit to 
the applicability of the RBV: it only holds as long as the 'rules of the game' in an industry remain 
relatively fixed. In unpredictable environments, in which new technologies and/or new markets 
emerge and the value of resources can drastically change, we need to go beyond the RBV to 
explain a firm's SCA. But so long as we are explicit about this, though, it cannot be said to cause 
the RBV problems that are not equally visited on other applied theories. 
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Critique # 4. SCA is not Achievable 
 
The RBV's focus is on achieving an SCA that sustains beyond others' efforts to duplicate or 
eliminate it. The assumption that an SCA is actually achievable has become the source of a 
fourth type of critique. For example, whereas Fiol (1991) supports SCA, Fiol (2001) explicitly 
rejects it, arguing that: “Both the skills/resources, and the way organizations use them, must 
constantly change, leading to the creation of continuously changing temporary advantages” (Fiol, 
2001: 692). This picks up on the previous critique and is the Marshallian quasi monopoly and 
equilibrium argument that every SCA must eventually be competed away. Eisenhardt & Martin 
(2000) and D’Aveni (1994) draw similar conclusions. But the difference here is that firms are not 
passive; as these studies suggest, a competitive advantage can only be sustained at the dynamic 
level through advantageous 'dynamic capabilities' or 'organizational learning', enabling the firm 
to adapt faster than its competition. Inimitability is progressively compromised by ‘spillovers’ as 
the firm's products and services continue to reveal strategic information about the processes that 
produce them. So a firm must keep on innovating as its revenue stream is constantly exposed to 
new competitors, substitute products, and so forth (Porter, 1980).  
We accept no SCA can last forever, but in the short run it remains a powerful strategic 
concept. It directs management’s attention to the dynamics that support it, emphasizing the term 
‘sustained’, looking for practical ways of beating the market's own 'natural' timing, quickening 
innovation or slowing imitation. We also accept that in a dynamic environment firms cannot 
derive an SCA from a static set of resources. However, the RBV's logic applies as much to 
dynamic capabilities as it does to the firm’s other resources (Barney, Wright, & Ketchen Jr., 
2001). While in static environments some static unique resource could lead to SCA, dynamic 
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environments call for dynamic capabilities (Helfat et al., 2007). With the inclusion of dynamic 
capabilities, the RBV can account for ex post sources of SCA (Makadok, 2001b). Through these, 
firms are able to increase the productivity of the resources they have already acquired and protect 
them from imitation through isolating mechanisms. Against this, the RBV’s ex ante sources of 
SCA follow from having preferential and asymmetric information about the future value of the 
available resources. Such advantage, though, may be static in nature and then may not lend itself 
to the cultivation of future rent-generation opportunities. Specifically, it denies entrepreneurs can 
make repeatedly superior resource acquisition, development, and allocation decisions (Bromiley 
& James-Wade, 2003; Foss et al., 2008). Hence, while we dismiss the fourth critique, concluding 
that SCA is indeed achievable, we conclude the RBV accounts mainly for its ex post sources.  
 
Critique # 5. The RBV Is Not a Theory of the Firm 
 
The fifth critique is that the RBV unsuccessfully reaches for a theory of the firm. The proposition 
that the RBV could be considered a new theory of the firm was put on the agenda by Conner 
(1991) and Kogut & Zander (1992). Their conclusion was that the RBV is indeed striving to be a 
theory of the firm, one that differs materially from other available theories of the firm, in 
particular from transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson & Winter, 1991). Five years later, 
with the expanding interest in knowledge as a strategic resource, discussions around the RBV as 
a theory of the firm were the focus of dialogue in Organization Science (Barney, 1996; Conner 
& Prahalad, 1996; Foss, 1996a, 1996b; Kogut & Zander, 1996) and a special issue of Strategic 
Management Journal (Grant, 1996b; Liebeskind, 1996; Spender, 1996).  
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In an important commentary Foss (1996a, 1996b) concluded the RBV is insufficient as a 
theory of the firm. The RBV explains differences between firms and why firms are better at rent-
creation than individuals. With their focus on the coordinative and integrative capabilities of 
organizations, it is in particular the knowledge-based versions of the RBV that provide such 
explanations (Dosi, Faillo, & Marengo, 2008; Foss, 2007; Grant, 1996a). However, for an 
explanation of why firms exist, why their boundaries and internal organization are as they are, 
and why they are better at rent-creation than markets, specific references to incentives, asset 
ownership, and opportunism are required. Five years later we find Foss's conclusion supported 
(Mahoney, 2001; Priem & Butler, 2001a).  
 While we agree the RBV is no theory of the firm this does not render the RBV 
problematic as a theory of rents and SCA. Despite the Conner (1991) and Kogut & Zander 
(1992) papers, the RBV's originators have maintained it is not a putative theory of the firm and 
that they had no intention of explaining the existence or boundaries of firms (Barney, 2005; 
Barney & Clark, 2007; Peteraf & Barney, 2003). Given that TCE addresses such questions 
directly, the RBV seems more a complement to TCE (Barney, 1999; Gibbons, 2005) and we see 
no reason to require the RBV to meet the criteria for a theory of the firm.  
   
Critique # 6.  VRIN/O is neither Necessary nor Sufficient for SCA 
 
Thus far we argue the RBV stands up tolerably well to the first five critiques. As long as it is 
applied with care no real problems have emerged. Three remaining critiques, though, cause it 
more serious problems. The key to the RBV is that SCA can be achieved by applying resources 
and capabilities when these are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN) plus 
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when there is an appropriate organization in place (O) (Barney, 1994). The first axiom has been 
subject to a further critique, that the VRIN/O criteria are neither sufficient nor necessary to 
explain SCA. One version of the sufficiency critique concerns the lack of empirical support for 
the RBV. As two recent reviews point out (Armstrong & Shimizu, 2007; Newbert, 2007), 
empirical research has generated only modest support, implying other factors must be considered 
when explaining SCA. The sufficiency critique is not limited to methodological issues. It has 
been noted several times that the possession of resources is not sufficient and it is only by being 
able to deploy these that SCA can be attained (Makadok, 2001b; Peteraf & Barney, 2003). Yet, 
by applying the VRIN/O logic to such 'deployment capabilities' as well, the RBV skirts a full 
explanation for SCA because we are left without a theory of capability deployment. Besides the 
sufficiency critique, there are also studies arguing the VRIN/O criteria are not necessary to 
explain SCA. Foss & Knudsen (2003), for example, argue that uncertainty and immobility are 
the truly basic conditions for an SCA to arise; any other conditions, they argue, are simply 
additional to these. Along a similar line, Becerra (2008) points at value uncertainty, resource 
specificity, and firm-level innovation as conditions under which profits can emerge in the RBV.  
These comments suggest fundamental disagreements about the nature of markets, individuals 
and resources, and the roles these play in generating SCA. When introducing the RBV, we 
summarized the canonical RBV positions. But along with these, two alternative positions have 
emerged that contain fundamental critiques to the RBV’s key assumptions. The first concerns the 
assumption that the locus of SCA lies at the component-level, especially at the level of the 
individual resource. Criticism here has come in several varieties, drawing attention to the set of 
productive opportunities (Penrose, 1959), integrative capabilities (Grant, 1996a), 
interdependencies (Kor & Leblebici, 2005), and asset co-specializations and complementarities 
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(Teece, 2007) as sources of SCA. Their common denominator is the assertion it is not the value 
of an individual resource that matters, but rather the synergistic combination or bundle of 
resources created by the firm.  
The second critique argues the RBV narrows the attributes of entrepreneurs and managers to 
having 'entrepreneurial alertness' and superior information on the future value of resources. 
Founded on Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921), the Penrosian view of the entrepreneur  
(Connell, 2007; Penrose, 1959; Pitelis, 2007), and the Austrian economic subjectivist view of 
resource heterogeneity (Foss, 1994; Menger, 1871; von Mises, 1949), this critique argues that the 
RBV does not sufficiently recognize the role of the individual judgments or mental models of 
entrepreneurs and managers (Foss, Foss, & Klein, 2007a; Foss et al., 2008; Mahoney, 1995). It 
further argues that the locus of SCA lies in the characteristics of individuals and teams making 
up the firm rather than in resources or market failures. This is not to say that there are no 
resources that can be valuable for most or even all organizations; there may be plenty, including 
specific human resource practices, quality management systems and procedures that facilitate 
learning. Though even these may require firm-specific adjustments, they nevertheless have the 
potential of being valuable for every organization. The point here is that to create SCA a firm 
needs both a bundle of resources and the managerial capabilities to recognize and exploit the 
productive opportunities implicit in them. The deeper question is whether such knowledge can be 
legitimately or usefully treated as a resource of the same type as those in the bundle. As we shall 
make clear later, we think they cannot.  
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Critique # 7. The Value of a Resource is too Indeterminate to Provide for Useful Theory 
 
A critique that has resonated widely is that the RBV is a tautology that fails to fulfill the criteria 
for a true theory. Lockett et al. (2009) and Priem & Butler (2001a, 2001b) argue the RBV does 
not contain the law-like generalizations that must be expected. Rather, it stands on analytic 
statements that are tautological, true by definition, that cannot be tested. We see this explicitly in 
Barney’s original article: 
“Firm resources include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, 
knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve 
its efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991a: 101). 
 
“Resources are valuable when they enable a firm to conceive of or implement strategies that improve its 
efficiency or effectiveness” (ibid.: 105). 
 
“A firm is said to have a competitive advantage when it is implementing a value creating strategy not 
simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitor” (ibid.: 102, or. italics). 
 
When considering that Barney (2002) defines SCA in line with Porter (1985) in terms of 
improved efficiency (reducing cost) and effectiveness (increasing value), we see the RBV is 
unmistakably tautological: value and uniqueness appear in both explanans and explanandum. 
The main problem here lies in the RBV’s indefinite notion of value (Priem & Butler, 2001b).  
In an attempt to clarify the RBV notion of value, Bowman & Ambrosini (2000) suggest three 
concepts of value: perceived use value (the perception of value by a customer), total monetary 
value (the amount of money a customer is prepared to pay), and exchange value (what is actually 
paid). They also suggest distinguishing value creation, value capturing, and value assessment. 
Such work, and that of Hoopes, Madsen & Walker (2003), Hoopes & Madsen (2008), and 
Peteraf & Barney (2003) call upon the ‘value-price-cost framework’ (Anderson & Narus, 1998; 
Tirole, 1988). In another clarification, Makadok (2001b) argues the value of resources can 
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appear a priori, by assessing value at the moment of their selection, while the value of 
capabilities only appears post hoc, after resource deployment.  
To some extent, these distinctions have clarified the equivocal notion of value offered in the 
initial RBV publications. However, they have not resolved the RBV’s tendency to tautology. 
Since the value of a resource and the SCA it generates are defined in identical terms, the 
explanans and the explanandum of the RBV remain the same. A question then is, if the core 
message of the RBV is so clearly tautological, how are we to interpret the RBV? A first option 
would be to think of the RBV as a heuristic for managers, a definition and illumination of SCA 
and its sources, rather than as a theory. In which case the RBV's message would be that firms 
should strive to differentiate themselves by developing and obtaining resources to which no other 
firm has access – and at a cost less than the resulting increase in price or decrease in costs. This 
may not seem noteworthy to today’s managers: “This is so obvious that I suspect that we soon 
will drop the compulsion to note that an argument is ‘resource-based’.” (Wernerfelt, 1995: 173). 
Yet, almost fifteen years after this comment, management scholars still feel this compulsion.  
 Alternatively, if we are to consider the RBV a theory, we must find a way to decouple or 
deny the tautology. This would require that ‘value’ means something different in the explanans 
than in the explanandum and thus that the value of a firm’s resources and capabilities must be 
determinable independently of the value of products/services delivered to the firm’s customers. 
The imprecise and tautological definitions of value offered in the seminal work have triggered 
several debates around whether value in the RBV is determined endogenously (by the firm), 
exogenously (by the market) or otherwise. Where Makadok (2001a) and Makadok & Coff (2002) 
argue value is determined endogenously in terms of the resource’s contribution to profit after 
being combined with other ‘complementary’ resources; Priem & Butler (2001a) argue it is 
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determined exogenously by the market. Since Barney (2001) agrees explicitly with Priem & 
Butler, we must assume value in the RBV should be determined exogenously. But the RBV itself  
does not provide the means for such alternative external determination (Priem & Butler, 2001b).  
A second route for addressing the tendency to tautology could be to attend to the time lag 
between acquiring VRIN resources and gaining an SCA. This would mean that the value of a 
firm’s resources and capabilities at time t = x is considered the explanans (having VRIN 
resources) and the value at time t = x + 1 is considered the explanandum (SCA). In other words, 
a firm’s SCA today depends on the non-resource-produced transformation of its prior resource 
bundle. This move would reframe the RBV as a theory of path dependency or constraint over 
strategic resource allocations in which there is little room for managers to lead their firm 
intentionally towards SCA. Explanations for deviations from such a pre-defined path then must 
be sought outside the RBV. Yet it is precisely these explanations that are most interesting and 
that might illuminate how or why firms differ even when they have similar initial resource 
endowments and make radical changes over time. Since both arguments take us well beyond the 
current RBV discourse, we conclude the RBV is still more of a heuristic than a substantial theory 
about differentiated resources and SCA production. At the heart of the canonical RBV, then, we 
see increasing difficulties with establishing external 'objective' bases for resource value, and 
argue later that incorporating more subjective and firm-specific notions of value might better 
address this critique.  
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Critique # 8. The Definition of Resource is Unworkable 
 
A final telling critique to the RBV focuses on its axiomatic definitions, especially that of 
resource. Exemplary definitions are:  
“By a resource is meant anything which could be thought of as strength or weakness of a given firm. More 
formally, a firm’s resources at a given time could be defined as those (tangible and intangible) assets which are 
tied semi-permanently to the firm” (Wernerfelt, 1984: 172) 
 
“Firm resources include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, 
knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve 
its efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991a: 101; 2002: 155). 
 
“The firm’s Resources will be defined as stocks of available factors that are owned or controlled by the firm” 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993: 35, or. italics) 
 
These are clearly overly inclusive (Priem & Butler, 2001a). While Barney (2001) suggests the 
all-inclusiveness is part of the RBV’s strength, it is surely a weakness so long as it drives the 
theory towards tautology. Specifically, if we accept these all-inclusive definitions there is 
nothing strategically useful associated with the firm that is not a resource. Since attributes such 
as trust, cost leadership, economies of scale, and learning curve economies might also be 
considered resources (Barney, 2001; Barney & Clark, 2007; Barney & Hansen, 1994), indeed we 
find every reason to regard having an SCA a resource as well.  
The inclusive definitions of resources are problematic for two reasons. First, they do not 
sufficiently acknowledge the distinction between those resources that are inputs to the firm and 
the capabilities that enable the firm to select, deploy, and organize such inputs.  This problem is 
particularly apparent when we consider the notion of a 'dynamic capability'. These have been 
defined as “The firm’s processes that use resources – specifically the processes to integrate, 
reconfigure, gain and release resources – to match and even create market change. Dynamic 
capabilities thus are the organizational and strategic routines by which firms achieve new 
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resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003). Similar distinctions have been offered by Makadok 
(2001b), Amit & Schoemaker (1993), Barney, Wright & Ketchen (2001) and Peteraf (1993). 
While these authors distinguish capabilities from resources, the inclusive definitions above 
clearly include them and treat all in the same way. Hence, we are left puzzled about the RBV’s 
core concept.  
A second problem is that the RBV does not address fundamental differences in how different 
types of resources may contribute in a different manner to a firm’s SCA. While the RBV 
recognizes different types of resource – for example physical capital, human capital, and 
organizational capital (Barney, 1991a) – it treats them all in the same way. Along this line, 
Barney & Clark (2007) suggest the typologies so far offered are mere labels for which the basic 
logic of the RBV still holds. They also suggest that different labels would only be appropriate if 
these referred to an alternative logic of linking a firm’s assets with its SCA.  While they seem to 
favor a single logic and terminology – not caring whether this would be labeled ‘resource-based’, 
‘capability-based’, or ‘competence-based’ – our conclusion is quite opposite: the RBV could 
improve substantially if its basic logic would be refined by explicitly recognizing differences 
between types of resources – static, dynamic; tangible, intangible; financial, human, 
technological; deployed, in reserve; perishable, non-perishable; and so on – and between types of 
resource ownership.  
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Conclusions on the Critiques 
 
The eight critiques and our assessments of them are summarized in Table 1. We argue the RBV 
can withstand five quite well when its variables, boundaries, and applicability are more clearly 
specified. Three critiques, though, cannot be so easily dismissed. These concern the 
indeterminate nature of two concepts fundamental to the RBV – resource and value – and the 
RBV’s narrow explanation of a firm's SCA. The common theme underlying these last three 
critiques is that the RBV has clung to an inappropriately narrow neo-classical economic 
rationality. With its over-emphasis on the possession of individual resources, and insufficient 
acknowledgement of the importance of bundling resources and of the human involvement in 
assessing and creating value, it does not sufficiently capture the essence of competitive 
advantage, neither statically nor dynamically. We conclude the RBV can only fulfill its promise 
as a central theory of SCA through a re-consideration of these fundamentals. Below we offer our 
views on how future theorizing and research might do this.   
  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
While the RBV has been subject to its fair share of academic sniping, we conclude three 
critiques are deeply damaging. They show where further development is needed if the RBV's 
reputation is to be sustained. In the rest of this paper we outline directions, summarized in Table 
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2, for some specific future theorizing and research that, we hope, will help take the discourse 
forward.  
 
Demarcating and Defining Resources 
 
As Critique #8 argued, to advance the RBV, clearer demarcations between what are and what are 
not resources, and between various types of resource, are needed. This reductionist strategy is in 
line with the RBV's own initial micro-foundational impulse. Clearly, some of the RBV literature 
attempts to distinguish resources from capabilities. Yet a limitation of the capabilities approach 
is that even the processes of resource development and deployment are – like the resources 
themselves – conceptualized as capacities, inclining us to think in terms of their possession 
rather than in terms of integration and application. To arrive at a better-determined concept of 
resources and capabilities, it is useful to distinguish capacity from action (or process) explicitly; 
resources and capabilities should both be conceived as capacities that enable a firm’s actions 
(Hodgson, 2008). They allow firms to perform their actions but – at the same time – constrain 
them. Future theorizing would also benefit from distinguishing explicitly between building or 
acquiring capacity (which includes resources and capabilities) on the one hand, and the 
managerial processes of deploying that capacity on the other hand. By doing so, a more practical 
resource-based theory about which resources and capabilities to deploy and which to keep in 
reserve might be developed.  
So far, empirical studies on the RBV have primarily adopted a variance approach with a set 
of resources and capabilities as independent variables and performance or SCA as the dependent 
variable. Such research leaves the processes by which resources and capabilities are deployed 
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black-boxed. Opening this black-box requires the repertoire of empirical research methods to be 
extended towards process-based approaches (e.g., Groen, Wakkee, & De Weerd-Nederhof, 2008; 
Van de Ven, 2007; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992). Only by combining both approaches will we be 
able to understand which resources and capabilities are sources of SCA and how some firms are 
able to perform better than others (Holcomb, Holmes Jr., & Connelly, 2009; Mahoney, 1995; 
Makadok, 2003; Sirmon, Gove, & Hitt, 2008; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). 
 The distinction between capacity and action – between potential and realized value – will 
also benefit from further analysis of property rights issues around the RBV. Typically the 
canonical RBV literature trivializes ownership, suggesting it is complete and unconstrained. 
Property rights comprise rights to consume, obtain income from, and alienate resource attributes 
(Alchian, 1977; Alchian & Demsetz, 1973). By assuming firms have a complete and 
undifferentiated control over resources, the RBV fails to recognize the various types of rights 
that can be associated with a particular resource and the strategically significant distinctions 
between them. As a result, it assumes a resource is owned by one firm only and that this firm has 
the complete control over this resource. Decades of theorizing property rights have demonstrated 
this is a gross oversimplification; if only because there would be no rights to acquire a resource if 
the rights of individuals were unlimited (Coase, 1960). The control over a resource by a single 
firm is limited since a firm can only obtain part of the rights associated with the resource, and 
often has to share the resource with other firms (Demsetz, 1967). Firms, then, can be considered 
to have ‘bundles of partitions of property rights’ (Kim & Mahoney, 2005: 236) or, preferably, as 
an ‘integrated bundle of interacting property-rights’ (Spender, 1983: 2). Based on a property 
rights perspective, the RBV should focus not only on resources per se but even more so on the 
specific rights associated with them. It is the distribution of property rights across several firms 
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that affects the extent to which the potential capacity of a resource can be realized (Kim & 
Mahoney, 2005). When the distinction between resources and property rights is taken into 
account, future research on the RBV might generate deeper understanding of how, in the 
practical world of legal and institutional constraints, resources actually contribute to SCA and 
performance. Given especially that human and intellectual capital are hard to own or control, a 
property rights and contracts perspective may prove particularly useful in analyzing how human 
and intellectual capital can be sources of SCA in relation to the firm (Bowman & Swart, 2007; 
Coff, 1997; Dean & Kretschmer, 2007).  
To further enhance the RBV, future studies should also consider that different types of 
resources might contribute to a firm’s SCA in different ways. We need typologies with direct and 
identifiable implications for the theory that would classify resources based on their manner of 
contributing to a firm’s SCA. Differentiating between resources and emphasizing their different 
characteristics could prove useful. The deeper suggestion is to move from seeking an 'objective' 
or external definition of resource or value to one defined by the situation or context, implying 
there cannot be a single universal way of categorizing resources (Mahoney, 1995; Penrose, 
1959). While there are many ways of approaching this, we shall limit the discussion to one 
category we think deserves special attention.  
No resource is probably more problematic than knowledge (Spender & Scherer, 2007). The 
RBV literature suggests the main difference between knowledge and other types of resources 
resides in its intangibility. Another characteristic of knowledge, hardly taken into account in the 
RBV, is its non-rivalrousness – meaning that its deployment by one firm, or for one purpose, 
does not prevent its redeployment by the same or another firm, or for another purpose. On the 
contrary, deploying knowledge may increase it (Winter & Szulanski, 2001). The distinction 
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between rivalrous and non-rivalrous resources has axiomatic implications for the RBV. Based on 
strategic factor market logic, the RBV assumes resources are scarce and firms must compete to 
obtain the best. While such neo-classical economic logic applies to rivalrous resources it cannot 
apply to non-rivalrous resources for which there is no scarcity. Cooperation and co-development 
may prove to be effective ways of obtaining strategically significant knowledge. When 
knowledge increases after deployment, externalities can arise and sometimes all can benefit from 
others' applying that knowledge. By engaging this distinction between rivalrousness and non-
rivalrousness, the RBV can better capture the fact that many firms nowadays cooperate 
intensively – while still competing. As we look within firms, the management of non-rivalrous 
resources differs greatly from the management of rivalrous resources. If a resource can be used 
only once, managers must focus on its efficiency in use and attempt to take advantage of as many 
productive opportunities as possible (Penrose, 1959). But if a resource is increased by its 
deployment that resource should probably be deployed as widely and frequently as possible; the 
more it is deployed, the more advanced it will become. We believe further theorizing and 
research on learning-by-doing and learning-curve implications of the RBV should prove fruitful  
here (Yelle, 1979) .  
 As we have argued above, the RBV focuses on individual and separable resources and 
their inherent characteristics. As Newbert (2007) demonstrates, resource configurations (or 
combinations as they are called there) are more likely to explain performance than single 
resources. This empirical evidence suggests that a component level of analysis is insufficient (see 
also Critique #6). If we are to understand the complementarity and substitutability of resources in 
a firm, we need to consider the organizational level as well. Some attempts at this have been 
made in the knowledge-based literature, of which Spender’s and Grant’s work may deserve 
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further attention. Spender’s (1994, 1996, 2005) distinction between individual and social 
knowledge points to crucial differences between individual and organizational resources. Grant 
(1996a, 1996b) provides the rudiments of a resource-based theory based largely on these 
differences. Paraphrasing Penrose's distinction between resources and services, Grant (1996a) 
argues it is not resources themselves that generate CA, but the managerial capabilities to 
integrate these resources (see also Kraaijenbrink & Wijnhoven, 2008). Grant goes on to develop 
a hierarchy of integration capabilities from the level of individual resources to the level of 
organizational capabilities. Combined with the notions of asset co-specialization and 
complementarities (Stieglitz & Heine, 2007; Teece, 2007) and the insight that complex 
interdependencies exist between multiple levels of strategy (Kor & Leblebici, 2005), Grant’s 
work provides a promising starting point for further developing the RBV with a more refined 
concept of resource.  
 
Towards a Subjective and Firm-Specific Notion of Resource Value 
 
As summarized in Critique #7, the RBV’s notion of value has been subject to broad and effective 
criticism. Clarifications have helped (e.g., Peteraf & Barney, 2003) but have not fully resolved 
the RBV's tendency to tautology. Moreover, they do not sufficiently address the observation that 
firms can generate an SCA from apparently valueless or even burdensome resources. The RBV’s 
defining assumption is that value is a characteristic of one or more of the firm’s resources. This 
assumption is based on (boundedly) rational reasoning as a method of inference and further 
assumptions about the continuity and predictability of markets. These assumptions may not hold 
in environments that are not mature or predictable. As Penrose argued, markets give resources a 
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certain price, but the value that a firm creates and captures from them is not fully determined by 
that price (Penrose, 1959). Thus the management's own 'subjective' assessment of the value of a 
resource and is every bit as determining of its possible value to the firm as any reasoning or 
quality inherent to the resource itself.  
Along these lines RBV-theorists may want to reconsider, as do Witt (1998, 1999, 2007), 
Sarasvathy (2001; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005), and Baker & Nelson (2005), that the processes of 
value assessment include those of conceiving ways to create and capture novel value through a 
specific resource. This moves us beyond the closed universe of discourse that characterizes much 
of neo-classical economics and, given its neo-classical roots, much of the RBV discourse, and 
into a humanly-constructed world in which value creation starts from our imaginings and leads to 
constructive and explorative action. As Foss et al. (Foss et al., 2007a; Foss, Foss, Klein, & Klein, 
2007b; Foss & Ishikawa, 2007; Foss & Klein, 2005), Kor, Mahoney, & Michael (2007), and 
Alvarez & Busenitz (2001) argue, the practical assessment and evaluation of resources involves 
subjectivism, knowledge creation, and entrepreneurial judgment.  
There is an element of Say’s Law here, the implication that supply creates its own demand, 
for the effective imagination of a novel product or service can lead to the creation of its own 
market. As in the case of value assessment, the entrepreneur plays a pivotal role. Merely 
imagining value does not create and capture it. For its actual creation, firms will need all kinds of 
resources to help turn their ideas into reality – including having other firms or people value what 
has been produced (Anderson & Narus, 1999; Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007). The role of the 
entrepreneurs cannot be limited to imagining value that others do not see. Rather, it must 
embrace bringing the resources together in such a way that the value they imagine is delivered. 
This imagining of value and the bringing together of resources can be considered a process of 
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mutual interaction in which resources partially shape peoples' mental models and these enable 
them to find value in the resources (Foss et al., 2008; Mahoney, 1995). Thus value must be 
discovered and created through practice that is anticipated and reflected upon imaginatively and 
subjectively. Likewise selling is a social process by which managers or entrepreneurs create 
value by convincing others of the value of their products. This implies value creation involves all 
kinds of internal and external social influence mechanisms including the use of rhetoric, power, 
and bargaining (Coff, 1999).  
The key differences here from the current RBV are that in environments that are not highly 
predictable and mature, the primary locus of value creation may lie within the firm, within the 
imaginative and creative capabilities of the people involved in it, rather than in the market and 
the prices of the resources they obtain (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003; Romer, 1990). By ‘the 
people involved’ we imply both the employees and the many not conventionally considered to be 
members of the firm, such as ‘lead users’ (von Hippel, 1986) or those who materially shape its 
infrastructure, such as government regulators. Hence, while we agree with Penrose (1959), Foss 
et al. (2008), Kor & Mahoney (2004), and Mahoney (1995) that the entrepreneurial or 
managerial team plays a pivotal role in recognizing and creating value, our conception of the 
people involved is even more inclusive. Locating the source of value creation within the 
imagination of those networked provides room for radical, disruptive innovation and a dynamic 
view of value in the RBV (Foss & Foss, 2008). Where the external focus on resources tends to 
stress the path dependent, evolutionary nature of change, it may be the sudden idea that ignites 
revolutionary modes of value creation. As these more subjective and creative notions of value 
are incorporated into the RBV, they bring human imagination back to the center of strategic 
management theorizing.  
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The idiosyncratic nature of resource value is further shaped by the specific institutional 
context of a particular firm. The value of resources in the RBV may therefore also be better 
understood as it incorporates insights from legal, institutional and property rights theorizing. 
Demsetz (1967) explicitly reminds us it is the value of the property rights that determines the 
value exchanged in a transaction rather than anything immanent in the underlying resource. 
Considering the various types of property rights that exist, we conclude a single resource can be 
a source of multiple values that differ between actors. One firm may have the right to consume a 
resource, even while another has the right to obtain income from that same resource, and yet 
another has the right to alienate some of the resource's attributes. While the underlying resource 
is notionally the same for all three, the values derived may differ substantially. It is the ‘socially 
recognized rights of action’ that are valuable here (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973). In other words it 
is what an individual firm or person is able and allowed to do with a resource that determines 
much of its value, as Coase (1960) suggested.  
 
The RBV as a Theory of Sustained Competitive Advantage 
 
By addressing the critiques to these two fundamental notions of the RBV, the previous two 
sections also serve as a starting point for addressing a final critique – Critique #6, that the 
VRIN/O criteria are not necessary and sufficient for SCA. We can bring what was said above on 
resources and value together with our suggestions on how the RBV might be developed into a 
more viable theory of SCA. We have suggested the clarity and explanatory power of the RBV 
should improve when it distinguishes clearly between the building, acquisition and possession of 
capacity (resources and capabilities) and the processes of deploying that capacity in the firm’s 
actions. This distinction leaves the RBV’s central proposition intact. As long as SCA embraces 
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the firm's potential to best its rivals (Peteraf & Barney, 2003) the RBV is correct in its focus on 
the building and possession of capacity. However, the moment we try to explain or predict the 
firm’s actual performance, i.e. its generation and appropriation of rents, the RBV turns out to be 
incomplete because it ignores the material contingencies of the firm's situation (Becerra, 2008; 
Powell, 2001) – precisely those considerations germane to the 5-forces analysis that the RBV 
sought to critique. To explain performance future studies should take into account the context 
and processes of resource deployment in realizing the value of resources.  
 We have also suggested future work on the RBV needs to account better for the many 
different types of resources, distinguishing between rivalrous and non-rivalrous resources, 
component-level and organizational-level resources and so on. But taking these into account 
impacts the RBV’s central proposition. Rather than taking a single concept of resources and 
capabilities and a single logic in resource-based theory, we need more refined propositions on 
the complex and dynamic relationships between particular types of resources, SCA, and rent 
creation. Moving between component-level and organizational-level resources will also help to 
further surface the role of organization (O) in the RBV’s central proposition. Rather than simply 
proposing an appropriate organization should be in place, it becomes more interesting to probe 
how newly developed or acquired resources should be matched and integrated with the resources 
already in place, as in mergers and acquisitions. As such, enhancing the notion of organization 
can lead to further insights in the selection and transformation of newly gathered resources and 
adjustments needed to the existing resources in place.  
 Concerning the VRIN characteristics, our critiques and suggestions have centered on the 
notion of value. In the RBV, a firm only has SCA when it possesses resources that have a higher 
value in a future market than in the current market and when competitors do not have these 
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resources. But as we move towards a more subjective and creative notion of value, the key to 
SCA is both the Penrosian disjunction between resources and services, and the acts of 
imagination that bridge the two, repairing or synthesizing them into a viable organization 
(Spender, 1994). Consequently no firm can come into being without SCA, for this simply refers 
to the finite gap between the resources deployed and the outcome necessary to overcome the 
inevitable transactions costs, inefficiencies and frictions. Thus beyond managing these resources 
there is the challenge to manage the imaginative processes which enable the firm to grasp the 
strategic disjunction between its resource-set and the market situation in which it is operating. It 
gains what we call ‘advantage’ only by successfully avoiding the equal possibility of 
‘disadvantage’ (Powell, 2001), by using imagination more effectively than its competitors in the 
search for novel means and ends. This involves acquiring, mobilizing, deploying, energizing, and 
retaining imaginative people. Future work on human resources will have to uncover how firms 
can do this (Chadwick & Dabu, 2009).  
 A final issue to which the critiques draw attention is the limited way in which the RBV 
deals with dynamic issues such as boundaries, timing, innovation, and entrepreneurship. With its 
focus on the possession of resources and capabilities, the RBV is inherently static, not well 
equipped to explain the timing of when value is created, rents are appropriated and how firms 
innovate and generate new sources of SCA. At the same time, recent developments in the 
streams of research on entrepreneurship (e.g., Langlois, 2007; Sarasvathy & Dew, 2005), 
dynamic capabilities (e.g., Teece, 2007), and the Austrian economics (Foss et al., 2007a; Foss & 
Ishikawa, 2007), may provide stepping stones to advancing more dynamic variants of the RBV – 
and some of the insights from these streams of research have been incorporated in this paper. 
Overall we suggest that to maintain its position as the favored theory of strategic management, 
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RBV theorists need to pay new attention to those streams of research and embrace some of their 
insights.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Our review itemized eight main issues with the RBV, of which three should not be dismissed too 
lightly. Of course, out of necessity we have simplified many authors' critiques and may be guilty 
of trying to remake arguments they have already made quite adequately. Notwithstanding, we 
hope we have shed additional light on the broad range of critiques offered to-date and thereby 
provided a way to separate the more telling from the less so.  
As our review and suggestions for future theorizing and research indicate, we feel the RBV 
community has clung to an inappropriately narrow neo-classical economic rationality and has 
thereby diminished its opportunities for progress over the last decade or so. We feel the sharpest 
yet most productive critiques have come from writers embracing the non-mainstream economic 
positions variously labeled Austrian, Knightian, evolutionary or otherwise 'non-equilibrium'. 
From their point of view the challenge is not to dissolve or recapture these critiques in a neo-
classical equilibrium framework, the very opposite. So there is some irony in many RBV writers' 
assumption that Penrose is the RBV's 'godmother', for her views were Austrian through and 
through (Connell, 2007). The way forward, we feel, is to move the RBV's agenda into the 
inherently dynamic Austrian framework, not by accentuating the rather unfortunately labeled 
'dynamic capabilities', but by incorporating time, space and uncertainty-resolution into the RBV's 
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axiomatic base. Going back to Marshall's work, every indication is that all SCA in a reasonably 
well-run socio-economy is perishable unless continuously invigorated by successful innovation. 
Inasmuch as the RBV's original impulse was to critique Porter's 5-force analysis (Spender, 1983, 
1994; Wernerfelt, 1984), we must conclude his real-estate metaphor of sustained superior 
positioning has done its valuable work but should now give way to the post-modern innovator's 
anxiety about the never-ending race against the market's own clock. We hope that our 
suggestions for future theorizing and research will help provoke this shift and help the RBV 
evolve into a more fully contextualized and managerially-relevant theory of competition 
management.  
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TABLE 1 
Summary and Assessment of Critiques to the RBV 
Critique Assessment 
1. The RBV has no 
managerial implications. 
Not all theories should have direct managerial implications. 
 
Through its wide dissemination, the RBV has evident impact. 
2. The RBV implies 
infinite regress. 
Applies only to abstract mathematical theories. In an applied theory 
such as the RBV levels are qualitatively different.  
 
It may be fruitful to focus on the interactions between levels rather 
than to consider higher levels prior as a source of SCA.  
3. The RBV’s 
applicability is too 
limited. 
Generalizing about uniqueness is not impossible by definition. 
 
The RBV applies to small firms and startups as well, as long as they 
strive for an SCA. 
 
Path dependency is not problematic when not taken to the extreme.   
 
The RBV only applies to firms in predictable environments. 
4. SCA is not 
achievable. 
By including dynamic capabilities, the RBV is not purely static. 
Though, it only explains ex post, not ex ante sources of SCA. 
 
While no CA can last forever, a focus on SCA remains useful. 
5. The RBV is not a 
theory of the firm. 
The RBV does not sufficiently explain why firms exist. 
 
Rather than requiring it to do so, it should further develop as a theory 
of SCA and leave additional explanations of firm existence to TCE.  
6. VRIN/O is neither 
necessary nor sufficient 
for SCA. 
The VRIN/O criteria are not always necessary and not always 
sufficient to explain a firm’s SCA.  
 
The RBV does not sufficiently consider the synergy within resource 
bundles as a source of SCA.   
 
The RBV does not sufficiently recognize the role that judgment and 
mental models of individuals play in value assessment and creation. 
7. The value of a 
resource is too 
indeterminate to provide 
for useful theory. 
The current conceptualization of value turns the RBV into a trivial 
heuristic, an incomplete theory, or a tautology. 
 
A more subjective and creative notion of value is needed. 
8. The definition of 
resource is unworkable. 
Definitions of resources are all-inclusive. 
 
The RBV does not recognize differences between resources as inputs 
and resources that enable the organization of such inputs.  
  
There is no recognition of how different types of resources may 
contribute to SCA in a different manner.  
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TABLE 2 
Suggestions for Future Theorizing and Research 
Demarcating and Defining Resources 
 
1. Theorize the distinctions between the building, acquiring and possessing capacity (which 
includes resources and capabilities) versus the processes of deploying that capacity. 
2. Conduct more process-based empirical research within the RBV frame to probe how 
resource-based SCA and performance are related. 
3. Integrate the insights provided by property rights theory into resource-based theorizing to 
improve our understanding of how resource attributes contribute to SCA and 
performance.  
4. Identify types or characteristics of resources that help refine the predictions of the RBV – 
that differ in the manner they contribute to a firm’s SCA. Specifically: 
a. Explore the distinction between rivalrous and non-rivalrous resources and the 
impact of this distinction on the predictions of the RBV. 
b. Expand on the distinction between resources and integrative capabilities and on 
the hierarchical relationship between individual and collective resources. 
 
Towards a Subjective and Firm-Specific Notion of Resource Value 
 
5. Bring human imagination into the center of the RBV: 
a. Investigate the value assessment processes by which new ways to create and 
capture novel value are conceived. 
b. Study whether and how human ideas ignite revolutionary modes of value creation. 
6. Study the social influence mechanisms through which entrepreneurs create value by 
convincing others of the value of their products. 
7. Focus theorizing about 'value' in the RBV on the socially recognized rights of action 
associated with resources rather than on some abstract objective value of the resources 
themselves. 
 
The RBV as a Theory of Sustained Competitive Advantage 
 
8. Develop a resource-based explanation of SCA that focuses on the differences in people’s 
capacities to identify or imagine and judge the potential risks and benefits associated with 
the ownership of resources. 
9. Develop refined propositions on the relationship between specific types of resources and 
a firm’s SCA. 
10. Study how new resources are selected and how they can be matched with the existing 
resources in place in the organization. 
11. Embrace insights provided by recent developments in the streams of research on 
entrepreneurship, dynamic capabilities, and Austrian economics in the RBV. 
 
 
 
